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The Constitutional-Political Nexus and Governor's Position: The Case of Governor Narasimhan's Regime, 2009-2019

S. Swaroop Sirapangi*

The article focuses on - how united Andhra Pradesh and the Telugu states Governor Narasimhan's decade long role can be analysed from a political dimension? Then concludes by pointing that all the involved constitutional and political actors, though critics one and other; in reality, they cooperate (informally) for 'political benefits'. Thus, the 'constitutional and political nexus' continues unabatedly without strengthening the demarcation between 'separation of powers'. Overall, the significance of the article could be observed in the light of post-Sarkaria Commission dynamics. Methodologically, the article followed 'political discourse analyses' and highlights on how constitutionally designed procedural democracy is in danger.

Introduction

The Indian National Congress (INC) led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime appointed ESL Narasimhan (Narasimhan) as Governor of Andhra Pradesh (AP) during one of the most turbulent phases of the then erstwhile 'united AP' in December 2009.¹ As per the Indian constitutional

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mandated provisions, Governors are appointed by the President of India. Moreover, upon assumption of office, Governor acts as the Union of India representative to the respective state. The President of India appoints Governors on behalf of the Union Government (Constitution of India, 2018). Though technically, Governors are appointed by the President of India, in reality, Governors are selected based on the 'forwarded recommendations' of the Union Government. The 'forwarded recommendations' of the Union Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister (PM) are mostly obligatory based on constitutional and legal norms (Noorani, 2002).

Governor's Position: Turbulent Democratic Background

The Governor's powers were much misused during PM Indira Gandhi's regime. With the breakdown of the single dominant player status of the INC in states and mushroom of regional parties, the INC started to target non-INC governments through the Governor's position and used to dismantle them. In due course of time, the regional parties raised their voice against the objectionable role of Governors in creating troubles for the regional parties headed governments in states. Furthermore, they effectively politicised the issue for quite some time. As a result, 'Sarkaria Commission' was appointed to consider renewed analysis, observations, and recommendations on the need for the better conduct of proper 'Union-state' relations (Sarkaria, 1988). Later on, in a famous verdict, i.e., *Bommai versus Union of India*, detailed guidelines were laid down by the Supreme Court of India to limit misuse of Governor's power and undue imposition of the President's rule (Pankaj, 2017).

After the breakdown of INC position as a single dominant player, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as a second dominant parallel national player. Both the INC and BJP are mostly heading federal politics through two alliances and coalitions. For instance, the INC inclined block is named as the United Progressive Alliance (UPA); on the other hand, BJP leads the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Chakrabarty, 2014). The INC and BJP led alliance and coalition politics indicate that either of these national parties is not in a full-fledged position to dominate federal and state politics confidently. These two national parties must engage with other regional players (Ruparelia, 2016). However, even after engaging with regional parties, these two national parties are interested in dominating and creating troubles for the regional parties headed governments through the Governor's position if required to promote their political interests.

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Even after Indira Gandhi's wide misuse of Governors' position, after careful implementation of the Sarkaria Commission recommendations to some extent, after the breakdown of the single dominant player status of the INC, after the much-acclaimed implementation of Bommai versus Union of India verdict; there remains another set of difficulties in the 'Union-state relations' through Governor's position (Singh, 2016). Recently, the BJP headed NDA created trouble for non-BJP governments in Assam, Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Pondicherry, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, etc. In all these states, the BJP attempted to create troubles for regional parties headed governments through the Governor's position. In a few states, the INC was in alliance or coalition. The BJP attempted to capture political power by creating turbulence in these states. In a few states, the BJP was successful in capturing political power. The role of the Governor also became crucial in some of these states when troubles were created. This indicates that a new level of creating troubles for the non-BJP regional parties is continuing in renewed fashion.

Governor from Non-Political Background

Narasimhan professionally belonged to the Indian Police Service. Later on, he headed a few significant tasks like Director of Intelligence Bureau. The UPA led INC had chosen Narasimhan as AP Governor at a turbulent political phase. The INC headed UPA Government gave additional charge as Governor to Narasimhan - apart from already discharged Chhattisgarh Governor's role, in December 2009. Later on, Narasimhan was appointed as the full-fledged AP Governor in January 2010. One of the prime visualised reasons for considering Narasimhan as Chhattisgarh Governor was due to prevalent turbulent dealing with 'political left's ideological extremism', i.e., Maoism. Narasimhan's Governor phase, after appointment in AP, was marked with stark criticisms at different points of time. (While) His appointment in Chhattisgarh was seen to engage in background mode with the 'left's extremist political ideology effectively'. On the other side, his transferred appointment in AP in the same capacity was seen to deal with the then widely prevailing 'Mass Telangana Movement', if required either directly or in background mode. Thus, as per this recognised perception, the Union Government attempted to utilise a retired bureaucrat in dealing with extreme political turbulences like those prevalent in the Chhattisgarh and AP. As per critics' observations, the most turbulent position in December 2009 and possible further deterioration made the INC led UPA Government to re-consider Narasimhan's candidature transferred from Chhattisgarh.²

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Governor's Involvement in 'Political Activities'

The over reliance of INC on the Governor's position to tackle its INC governed AP was unusual. Previously, during PM Indira Gandhi's regime, the INC misused the Governor's position by dismissing non-INC governments (Gopal, 1989; Chatterjee, 1972). However, during the INC headed UPA regime, the AP Governor's position was utilised to tackle its own governed state (AP was under the INC regime during 2004-2014). All this indicates that the INC at a certain level degraded politically in maintaining a solid political structure from national to the regional level and beyond, i.e., up to village level. Due to a lack of trust in its political caliber from New Delhi to the local level, the INC started to depend on the Governor's position. However, during this phase, it chose a non-political person as Governor, i.e., from December 2009 to 2014. By being a well-established party, the INC should have established proper authoritative sources to tackle any unwanted incidents in AP confidently.

Indeed, Governor's position was a source of power to deal with the Telangana movement during the imposition of 'Presidents' Rule' under emergency provisions of the Constitution. Telangana movement was a political movement. Nevertheless, the Governor's position is a constitutional one. Under the UPA regime, the INC degraded the Governor's position from constitutional to political level in AP, like during other regimes. All this 'political degradation' occurred due to a lack of faith in its AP INC Government and lack of confidence to tackle the AP situation. As a result, even during the 'non-emergency period', the INC resorted to utilise Governor's position in a backdoor manner for political benefits. All this indicates that Governor Narasimhan was appointed for political benefits under the shadow of a 'constitutional head'.

Back Door Political Cooperation

As per various informal views circulation, Narasimhan had played a crucial role in referring to the INC New Delhi regime - the best suitable person to head AP as Chief Minister (CM) in 2011. At this point, the AP INC Government plunged into a crisis after the tragic death of its CM, YS Rajashekar Reddy (YSR), in September 2009. After the death of YSR, the INC national leadership had a tough time appointing a new CM - through INC AP Legislative body's formal consent. As a temporary gesture, senior cabinet colleague of YSR - Rosaiah was elevated as the CM through the then AP Governor, ND Tiwari. Though the INC national leadership ensured

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Rosaiah got elevated as AP CM, such a measure was seen as a temporary solution. Even then, Rosaiah was continued as AP CM for about 14 months.

Furthermore, the INC was desperate to choose another suitable person as AP CM for an entire tenure upto 2014. During this time, YSR's son - YS Jagan Mohan Reddy (Jagan), emerged as a potential aspiring contender for CM's position. However, under Sonia Gandhi's leadership, the INC rejected demand favouring Jagan. Later on, the INC faced another intensified problem with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) Chief - Kalvakuntala Chandrashekar Rao's (KCR) fast-on-to-death agitation demanding the immediate formation of a separate Telangana State (TS).

These two incidents (Jagan's aspiration and backed support for AP CM's position and KCR's fast-on-to death for TS formation) considerably shook the INC national leadership. These two incidents also pushed the INC-led AP Government into profound instability. As a result, the INC national leadership delayed choosing a suitable candidate as AP CM. In fact, due to the involved most turbulent political position, it became difficult to choose an acceptable non-controversial person as the CM. Because all the AP Members of Parliament (MPs), Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), Members of Legislative Council (MLCs), etc., were divided into regional lines of 'Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana'. As a result, it became difficult for the INC national leadership to choose a non-controversial and acceptable person as the CM, who can be regarded as a balanced person, and equally take forward the sentiments of all three regions. At this point, the then AP Legislative Assembly (LA) Speaker - Kiran Kumar Reddy (KKR), developed an aspiration to become AP CM.³ Surprisingly, the INC national leadership had promoted KKR as the AP CM.

During this whole process, it was informally reported that Narasimhan had played a crucial role in suggesting KKR's suitable candidature to the INC national leadership for CM's position.⁴ It should also be noted that the INC national leadership might have certainly considered other politicians candidature for elevation as AP CM. Ultimately, after due contemplation, the INC national leadership had opted to elevate AP LA Speaker - KKR as AP CM. However, there were stark differences between CM KKR and Governor Narasimhan as per visible reports. Nevertheless, such differences were considered as low in intensity, as no significant outbreak occurred. Suppose Narasimhan's possible informal backdoor role should be considered for political analysis, suggesting to the INC national leadership - KKR's potential candidature for the CM position - in that case, Indian politics should be understood differently. Governors in India get

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appointed as representatives of the Union Government in states, and they are required to perform specific constitutionally defined roles. Nevertheless, when observed instances like the present reported and suspected part of Narasimhan in suggesting to the INC national leadership KKR's suitability as AP CM, then Narasimhan dislodged from strict constitutional duties and plunged into a political leader's role.⁵ In India, the thick and thin lines of separation of powers 'among those in the government, political parties, and constitutional position holders' have become a source of nexus (Devesh Kapur, 2018).

Dislodged from Regular Constitutional Duties!

In the initial days, it sounded that Narasimhan was appointed as Governor based on his long-standing exposure in police administration and intelligence bureau. Moreover, it was expected that his role as Governor would be beneficial to tackle the then prevailing extreme law and order problem due to the sporadic rise of the Telangana movement, which rose to prominence since the end of November 2009. In reality, as per constitutional spirit, Governors are not appointed to discharge such executive functions. However, in this case, Narasimhan's task in AP resembled an ordinary politician appointed as Governor for some sections suspicion. Different sections, including opposition parties like the TDP and TRS, critiqued Narasimhan's role (which he allegedly carried) contrary to his constitutionally assigned duties (Apparasu, 2018).

Usually, Governors in India forward confidential reports to the Union Government about the state governments' performance and prevailing law and order position. Contrary to such a confidential role, Narasimhan started to take sides with active politicians. For instance, his active association with the INC politicians until AP bifurcation in 2014 was silently reported and justified as taking part in consultation negotiations over AP bifurcation bill preparation, to be tabled before and passed by the Parliament of India (Politics and Nation, 2013). In reality, he was not appointed to perform such 'clerical tasks'. The works like the AP bifurcation bill can be prepared by suitable designated professionals, like those from the Ministry of Home Affairs. All this indicates that Narasimhan had started to favour and take sides politically, which was against the nature of his appointed position (Hyderabad, 2012). In 2012, after completing Narasimhan's five-year tenure, the INC led UPA extended his tenure for another five years.

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Bifurcation of AP

After the turbulent phase of intense Telangana movement in the Telangana region and anti-Telangana movement from other parts of AP, the united AP was finally bifurcated by an act of Parliament by the INC led UPA regime in February 2014. As a result of the AP bifurcation act coordinated by the INC led UPA Government, the INC Government led by KKR at the AP level resigned. Then due to CM's resignation, Narasimhan recommended imposition of the President's rule. Under the President's rule, the AP simultaneously proceeded for the 2014 general elections for its LA and Lok Sabha (LS) constituencies. After the election, the AP was formally bifurcated, and two states were formed, TS and 'residual AP'. The proper formal bifurcation of AP and formation of TS came into existence on 02 June 2014. After the 2014 general elections, the TDP captured power in the residual AP, and TRS formed the Government in the new TS. Interestingly, both the TDP and TRS Governments from 2014 onwards started to maintain good relations with Narasimhan.

The BJP led NDA Regime From 2014

As per the provisions of the AP Reorganisation Act of 2014, the Union Government continued Narasimhan as Governor to both the Telugu states (residual AP and TS). It was also reported now and then in the news that the NDA led BJP Government after the 2014 general election to the LS also preferred to continue Narasimhan as Telugu states Governor. Narasimhan continued to meet politicians, like the Union Home Minister and PM - other than the appointing authority, i.e., President of India (Andhra Pradesh, 2015) (K. Nageshwar, 2018b). Furthermore, he briefed them periodically about his esteemed unique successful role as Governor to the Telugu states. Narasimhan started to build rapport with the new regime change at the New Delhi level under the BJP led NDA in this mode. As a result of such rapport with the new regime, Narasimhan's position as Governor continued, even after his second successive term completion in 2017. He was made to continue as (temporary) Governor upto September 2019. Thus, Narasimhan could play and maintain cordial relations with the UPA and NDA regimes and continue as one of the most successful long-term served Governors.

Narasimhan assumed charge as Governor of the Chhattisgarh in January 2007. He was Governor of the united AP from 28 December 2009 to 01 June 2014. Later on, Narasimhan was joint Governor to TS and residual AP from 02 June 2014 to 23 July 2019. As a final resort, he was the exclusive

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TS Governor from 24 July 2019 to 07 September 2019. Narasimhan administered the oath of office to the CMs - Raman Singh (Chhattisgarh), KKR (united AP), KCR (TS), Nara Chandrababu Naidu (Naidu) (residual AP), and Jagan (residual AP). Thus, from the years 2007-2019, he had sworn in five CMs in three states, in addition to the Council of Ministers and other dignitaries. In fact, KCR was sworn in as TS CM for two consecutive terms in 2014 and 2018 (TNM Staff, 2019) (Pavan, 2019). Overall, he continued in the gubernatorial Governor's position for about 12 years - 7 months - 12 days.

Even after the INC led UPA Government lost power in the 2014 elections, and BJP led NDA assumed Union Government charge - Narasimhan continued to maintain relations with the political class, like with the new Union Home Minister, PM, etc. He completed his second successive five-year tenure as Governor in 2017 and continued as Governor without direct extension of tenure upto 07 September 2019 (Telangana, 2017). By all means, Narasimhan continued as one of the senior-most Governors in India even after a political regime change at the Union Government level from the INC led UPA to the BJP led NDA. This is one of the rarest of the rare occasions in Governor position's continuation favouring a single person in the Indian democratic history and discourse. Very few Governors have had got an extension beyond two successive terms. Though Narasimhan occupied Governor's position from a non-political background, he continued in Governor's office even after completing two consecutive terms.

Usually, any political party which captures the political power at the Union Government level recalls the Governors appointed in various states during the tenure of the previous party's/coalition governance regime. Though the NDA under BJP adopted the informal policy of recalling a few Governors' appointed during the last INC led UPA regime, Narasimhan was not recalled. Immediately upon the NDA regime under BJP leadership assumed Union Government's charge; as per various critics' arguments and observations, different persons started to establish and prove their so far unnoticed and hidden pro-Hinduness and Hindutva dimensions and started to grab potential opportunities in several folds. This dimension should be seen from the changed perspective of the BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) leadership styles from past times when BJP was projected as a 'party with a difference'. During the regime of PM Narendra Modi and Amit Shah as BJP national president, previous ideological distinctive position - BJP as a party with a difference - was kept aside, and this duo leadership started to engage even with the non-RSS and non-BJP sections for political gains. Thus, Narasimhan's continuation as Governor of Telugu states, even after

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the bifurcation of the united AP into residual AP and TS, was seen from this changed perspective of the BJP-RSS leadership dynamics. This indicates how astute Narasimhan could be in ensuring his successful continuation even after political regime change. Narasimhan maintained good relations with both the INC and BJP regimes from 2007 to 2014, i.e., the 'centrist and rightist' political sections⁶ (Journalist Diary, 2018) (Mahaa News, 2019).

Renewed Ties: TDP and TRS Relations with Narasimhan

During 2009-2014, both the TDP and TRS critiqued Narasimhan vehemently as two different opposition parties on a few occasions. The TDP and TRS mostly critiqued Narasimhan's actions from the Telangana movement perspective and non-adherence to constitutional and legal modalities. For instance, one of the prominent TRS leaders - Harish Rao, accused Narasimhan of favouring the coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema political interests.

Surprisingly after the 2014 elections and subsequent formation of two governments in respective Telugu states, the TDP and TRS started to embrace Governor Narasimhan with sweet-heart; especially the TRS was much forefront. This indicates that the previous opposition parties, TDP and TRS, which critiqued Narasimhan's actions during 2009-2014, after assuming charge as ruling parties from 2014 onwards, changed their stances and extended cordial relations with the same Governor. The previously made political, legal, procedural and technical critiques against Narasimhan were relegated to backdoor by these two parties. On another dimension, previously AP ruled INC from 2004-2014, under whose Union Governed INC led UPA tenure Narasimhan was appointed, expressed bitter dissatisfaction against Narasimhan's (alleged) colluded nexus with the TDP and TRS Governments and CMs (Current Affairs, 2015).

This modified cordial step of the TDP and TRS after the 2014 elections with Narasimhan should also be understood from the point of Union Government perspective - as Governor usually represents Union Government at the state level. Moreover, the Governor's change is not easy when a non-TDP and non-TRS coalition Government functions at the national capital. Interestingly, after the 2014 elections, TRS led the TS Government under KCR. Same-time, the residual AP Government was led by the TDP's Naidu. Both KCR and Naidu started to maintain cordial relations with Narasimhan! This was a calculated 'political reconciliation' on the part of all the involved parties, i.e., the Governor and both the Telugu states CMs!

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Dilution of Anti-Defection Act by Narasimhan

The newborn (undisclosed, yet understood and suspected) nexus between Narasimhan and Telugu states CMs was revealed in two incidents but in a related issue. As per opposition parties' critique, including that of the TDP in TS, Narasimhan and KCR had entered into a malicious hands-in-glove agreement contrary to the constitutional spirit.⁷ According to this criticism by the opposition parties, a TDP MLA in the TS was made to tender formal resignation (yet symbolic) to the TS LA Speaker. Even before accepting that resignation, Narasimhan, based on the recommendation of CM KCR, had inducted that MLA into the Council of Ministry (Krishnamoorthy, 2014) (NTV Telugu, 2014).

TDP critiqued this nature and action of KCR and Narasimhan on a large scale for quite some time. The TS LA Speaker failed to accept or reject TDP MLA's resignation and pave the way for a by-election. As a result, the newly inducted Minister continued to hold both MLA and Ministerial positions unabatedly. This whole incident exposed the colluded nexus between CM KCR, with other constitutional positions held by Narasimhan and TS LA Speaker, on the other side. The TS LA Speaker won the election as MLA on behalf of the TRS. Though the TDP critiqued Narasimhan's action for inducting a TDP MLA into KCR led Council of Ministry, even the TDP in residual AP resorted to the same measure. The TDP in residual AP lured 23 MLAs of (opposition) *Yuvajana Shramika Rythu* Congress Party (YSRCP) into its fold (News 18, 2017). Thus the TDP Government in residual AP under Naidu's CM regime had replicated KCR's style in inducting opposition party MLAs into the Council of Ministry.

The AP CM, Naidu, made YSRCP MLAs submit symbolic resignation letters to the residual AP LA Speaker. And even before the Speaker accepted those resignation letters, four YSRCP MLAs were inducted into Naidu's Council of Ministry through Narasimhan. This established the suspected and alleged colluded nexus between Naidu and Narasimhan. Previously, Narasimhan was critiqued for this same action in the TS by the TDP for inducting a TDP MLA into the KCR's Council of Ministry. However, the TDP in residual AP resorted to the same measure! Residual AP LA Speaker won as MLA on behalf of the TDP.

These two incidents of inducting opposition party MLA's into the Council of Ministry fold in TS and residual AP by the TRS and TDP led CMs amounts to violate anti-defection act in force and spirit (Reddy, 2015). Even Narasimhan violated this act's spirit. In both Telugu states, Narasimhan

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should have ensured to induct opposition party MLAs into the Council of Ministry, if respective LA Speakers formally approved their resignations or the MLAs represented the ruling section in any form like on either floor of the LA (i.e., LA or Legislative Council)! This is a blatant violation of constitutional and legal provisions and the spirit of parliamentary procedure. This whole episode and the (alleged) illegal process were challenged before law courts.

Technically, Narasimhan seemed to have justified his action as sub-judice since the (accused illegal and un-parliamentary convention) process was challenged in law courts. However, Narasimhan should have sort judicial advice before resorting to such a step. The former Presidents of India - Shankar Dayal Sharma and KR Narayan, used to indicate that some of their steps were consciously taken and used to inform the public through a press release on behalf of the *Rastrapathi Bhavan*, the official residence and Secretariat of the President of India. However, in reality, Narasimhan failed to emulate such a step. Even the judiciary could not rectify these alleged and challenged blatant constitutional and legal violations in time. Cases filed against these alleged gross constitutional and legal violations were pending at various law courts. Criticism rose to the peaks that the 'political and judicial' nexus also continues, in addition to rooted 'political and constitutional' positions nexus. In the present case, even Narasimhan resorted to the repeated extreme measures (by first inducting a TDP MLA into the KCR led Council of Ministry, and then four YSRCP MLAs induction into the Naidu's led Council of Ministry) (PTI, 2017).

When Narasimhan inducted a TDP MLA into the TRS led Council of Ministry under KCR's CM-ship, the TDP critiqued his action bitterly. However, in due time, the TDP Government in residual AP resorted to the same extreme measure through Narasimhan and inducted four opposition YSRCP MLAs into the Council of Ministry under Naidu's CM-ship. Thus, all this exposed that Narasimhan entered into an undisclosed political nexus with both the TDP and TRS ruling sections in residual AP and TS, respectively. This alleged and exposed political nexus of Narasimhan with two regional ruling parties headed Governments was in addition to his previously maintained political nexus with the INC led UPA and later with the BJP led NDA. According to political regime change, Narasimhan's political nexus and actions also underwent modifications, paving the way for the benefit of governing parties! Thus, Narasimhan failed strictly to adhere to the spirit of the Constitution and parliamentary procedural norms.

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The TDP and YSRCP Relations with Narasimhan from 2014

In April 2018, residual AP CM Naidu developed an intense conflict with Narasimhan. The TDP-BJP pre-election alliance of 2014 and continued post-election coalition Government regime at the national and residual AP levels ended due to (emotional) political conflicts and rivalry, primarily due to failure in the extension of 'special category status' to residual AP.⁸ Due to an intensified political critique and movement from the opposition YSRCP, the TDP withdrew its support to the BJP led NDA Government and cut-off ties with the BJP at the AP level (Chaturvedi, 2018).

The YSRCP had critiqued TDP for maintaining a coalition alliance with the BJP and continuing under the BJP led NDA Government, even after BJP failed to extend 'special category status to the residual AP'. After weighing due consequences and the YSRCP's focused criticism - ultimately, the TDP ended ties with BJP and NDA coalition. As a result, the BJP Ministers withdrew from the Council of Ministry led by Naidu. Similarly, the TDP Union ministers withdrew from Modi's led Union Council of Ministry. As a subsequent follow-up and as per revelations of various news reports and political commentaries, the BJP led NDA Government started to take revenge against the TDP Government. For quite some time, Naidu openly critiqued the active political role of Narasimhan. Later, as per various news reports, the BJP led NDA Government took multiple measures to intensify numerous pending cases against Naidu at various courts of law as a means of racking judicial harassment. In this sequence, a few TDP politicians were targeted by federal investigative agencies, albeit as a measure to fix them in corruption cases (By Express News Service, 2019).

The TDP alleged this move of Union investigative agencies role as a step taken on the undisclosed political orders of the BJP led NDA Government. However, at last, such an expected step to arrest did not arise against Naidu from the national investigative agencies. Nevertheless, the BJP's threatening attitude against the co (opposition political) parties across India makes some sections believe that the BJP, under the influence of the NDA, might resort to any extreme measures against persons like Naidu to arrest him; in order to obtain a better political prospectus for BJP in AP. As per certain dominant political analytical views in circulation, the BJP (led NDA) wishes to finish TDP and targets to transfer TDP's electoral base to the BJP in residual AP (K. Nageshwar, 2018a).

Interestingly, the YSRCP never openly critiqued Narasimhan for inducting four MLAs into the Naidu's Council of Ministry. However, the YSRCP and Jagan vehemently critiqued only Naidu and TDP over this issue.

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Moreover, the YSRCP has resorted to legal measures to secure justice against such a move. Nevertheless, the judiciary has failed to pronounce its verdict in time, so far. The YSRCP and Jagan's failure to critique Narasimhan in this respect should also be understood from the dimension of fear towards the BJP (led NDA), as Jagan too faces multiple financial crime cases filed against him. As a result, the YSRCP failed to effectively politicise Narasimhan's conventional and legal parliamentary norms violation, resulting in four YSRCP MLAs induction into the Naidu's Council of Ministry.

Implications for Union-State Relations

The above narrated political discourse throws light on Union-state relations. With the growth of regional parties, Union-state relations started to decline. Up-to-the decade 1980's end, the INC had a major prospectus as a single dominant player. Later on, the BJP emerged as a parallel second dominant contender at the national level. As a result, India's national politics continue under two broad sections led by the INC and BJP through various fronts. The regional parties mostly align with these two national parties led fronts. However, the composition of UPA and NDA alliances vary significantly over time. Moreover, national and regional players have no strict ideological chord strike to continue the alliance and coalition under the UPA or NDA. These two fronts' undergo variations depending on changed political circumstances.

Though now and then, the regional parties have a certain aspiration to play a dominant role in national politics, such aspirations failed to realise concretely. In this sequence, one can observe the PM tenures of Viswanath Pratap Singh, Chandra Shekar, Deve Gowda, and Indra Kumar Gujral. In some sense, all these PMs were promoted by the national parties like INC and BJP; and regional parties' leaders were elevated as PMs. However, this strategic step failed to sustain for long and failed to produce lasting results. Thus, even regional parties cannot alter the national prospects and initiate a few measures to further strengthen Union-state relations.

At some other level, regional political parties are also failing to politicise Governor's role, who acts, now and then, as per the wishes of the Union Government, led by either of the two major political parties and fronts, i.e., INC - UPA or BJP - NDA. As a result, occasional judicial verdicts concerning the role of the Governor are getting codified. The best instance lay in the Bommai versus Union of India verdict (Sathe, 2003). Nevertheless, national parties were dubious in misusing Governor's position through other emerged political circumstantial necessities in their favour. Thus, national

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parties lack proper commitment not to misuse the Governor's position. Moreover, regional parties fail to effectively politicise this issue on a collective front to set the discourse properly. As a result, the whole process poses a severe threat to the Union-state relations, which is a challenge to the constitutional checks and balances.

At one level, the solution to this problem lay in reviewing the role and prospects of the Governor properly as part of the Constitution. The judiciary can protect the Constitutional spirit concerning the Governor's role when such a chance emerges. For a comprehensive outcome, regional parties should initiate proper politicisation of the Governor's political roles for a sustained duration. However, most regional parties seem to have contended if their governments were not dismissed by the Governor, as per the wishes of national parties headed governments. Suppose the Governor's active political role continues for a sustained duration, without producing proper positive results, then the Union-state relations may encounter further intensified problems, provided even if the judiciary fails to interfere beyond a point. Failure to adhere to constitutionally designed 'procedural democracy', 'checks and balances' and parliamentary procedural norms result in chaos and anarchy (Saxena, 2018).

Conclusion

The article attempts to prove how political nexus continues between political leaders and parties on one side, with constitutional positions held by persons like Governor, highlighting Narasimhan's tenure from December 2009 to September 2019 in the Telugu region. During PM Indira Gandhi's tenure, high-level misuse of the Governor's position took place against the non-INC regimes; later on, such a situation altered to some extent. This article's uniqueness lay in focusing on Governor Narasimhan's engagement with different parties in power since December 2009 at the Union Government level, at the united AP range, and later on at residual AP and TS realm. At last, and at another level, the article throws light over post-Sarkaria Commission dynamics over Union-state relations.

On the whole, the article focused on Narasimhan's successfully continued political relations with the INC led UPA (2009-2014), BJP led NDA (2014-2019), INC led united AP (2009-2014), TDP led residual AP (2014-2019), and TRS led TS (2014-2019). Though in 2019, Narasimhan administered the oath of office to Jagan as residual AP CM, they both (Narasimhan and Jagan) maintained visible cordial relations. Though occasionally most of the parties critiqued Narasimhan's 'political role' for his debunk from 'constitutional

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practices', in reality, these involved parties were not sincere enough to demand and bring about further constitutional reforms for better-enhanced stature of Governor's office! At most, all the involved constitutional and political actors were comfortable enough to mitigate their interests to a possible extent through the Governor's office, as and when possible. Moreover, Narasimhan was also interested in altering his actions and function based on changing political situations rather than adhering to the constitutional practices and parliamentary procedural norms. This 'constitutional and political nexus' might change only when (regional) political parties show political resolution and initiate a few measures accordingly.

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End Notes

1. The 'united AP' referred to here has existed from its formation in 1956 to its bifurcation in 2014. 'Residual AP' refers to the position after bifurcation in 2014, i.e., after the formation of Telangana State.
2. ND Tiwari, the then AP Governor, was caught in a sensational sex scandal. As a result, Narasimhan was transferred to take charge upon ND Tiwari demitted office.
3. As Speaker of AP LA, he symbolically maintained political neutrality without expressing direct political opinions. Thus maintained political neutrality without expressing his opinion against or favouring separate TS formation became a boost for him at this point.
4. In addition to Narasimhan's role, it was also reported at some low level that KKR also lobbied through other INC sources like the then Union Home Minister, P Chidambaram.
5. The view that Narasimhan had a specific background role in suggesting KKR's candidature as CM to Sonia Gandhi got circulated and believed for quite some time, as such news was circulated in a certain section of media at that point.
6. Individual prominent media analysts like Prof K Nageshwar observed that Narasimhan had the then Union Home Minister's (P Chidambaram) backed support when the INC led UPA was in power. Later on, Narasimhan's close contact with the National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, during BJP led NDA helped him to maintain better contact with the BJP - NDA. Thus, during two different political parties led coalition regimes at the national level, Narasimhan successfully maintained good contacts and continued as Governor, as observed by Prof K Nageshwar.
7. The TDP is spread in both residual AP and TS. After the 2014 election, in residual AP, TDP captured political power. However, TDP was in opposition in the TS.
8. The non-extension of 'special category status to residual AP' was seen and reported at some level as an emotional one to Andhra people. The BJP promised to extend the

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same in the 2014 election campaign in residual AP in alliance with TDP. However, the BJP (led NDA) is seen and projected as a villain throughout this process for failing to fulfil the same. Since TDP was in an alliance with BJP led NDA during 2014-2018, TDP also faced the brunt of this emotional political conflict for failing to achieve special category status to residual AP.

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